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1 Introduction
One of the prominent way in which economists hâve modelled links bet-
ween households is based on the concept of altruism. People are said to
hâve altruistic préférences when they care about their relatives and, in par-
ticular about their children. This leads them to maximize a combination of
their lifetime well-being and their children's well-being. Altruism motivâtes
transfers like inter-vivos gifts and bequests.
Becker (1974) studied the rational game-type interaction which arises
between an altruistic parent and his selfish child. The latter's décision con-
sists in choosing actions which may increase his income at the expense of
his parent's income. The parent chooses the level of the transfer. Becker's
(1974) "Rotten Kid Theorem" states that the altruistic parent can induce
his selfish child to behave in the interest of the family. This is achieved when
the child takes for granted that his parent is sufficiently altruistic to make
a positive transfer. Then the child's best response is to choose his actions
in order to maximize the family income, i.e. the sum of his parent's and his
income. To obtain this, the parent does not hâve to engage in stratégie be-
havior to provide the selfish beneficiary with incentives. Instead, if the child
expects no transfer from his parent, his best response is to maximize his sole
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income. This resuit has received a substantial amount of attention (Becker
(1976), Hirshieifer (1977), Bernheim et al. (1985), Bergstrom (1987)).
However the structure of the child's best response function, i.e. whe-
ther a positive or a zéro transfer is expected, is not the only crucial feature
at work. Temporal aspects also matter. Becker's (1974) setting is a single-
period one. He suggested that his resuit extends to a multi-period setting if
the parent is able to follow a retaliatory strategy. Hirshieifer (1977) stressed
that, even in a single-period setting, the mère timing of the game décisions
is important. If the altruistic father makes a positive transfer before the kid
has chosen his action, the theorem does not hold. Indeed, the benefactor
must hâve the "last word" of the game.
Several authors developed thèse temporal aspects. They adopted a
two-period setting to introduce savings in the picture (Bernheim and Stark
(1988), Laitner (1988), Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), Bruce and Waldman
(1990)). In this framework, a "last word" transfer admittedly produces the
child's virtuous behavior but, at the same time, has a significant impact on
savings. The récipient clearly anticipâtes that the gift he is to receive later
will be higher the more deprived he présents himself to the benefactor in
the second period. This induces strategically low savings and a large second-
period transfer. This type of inefRciency is close to what is referred to as the
"Samaritan's Dilemma", in the literature on welfare programs (Buchanan
(1975), Coate (1995)). In our context a game between an altruistic parent
and a sefish child, the inefficiency means the following. The parent's willin-
gness to help his child if he falls on hard times drives the child to décisions
which leave him actually deprived. Thus the child's savings are "too low"
with respect to the level saved when the parent precommits on the level of
the transfer. A first-period transfer, preceding the child's choice of actions,
certainly acts as a precommitment but cancels the altruist's benefit of ha-
ving the last word. Thus the Rotten Kid Theorem does not hold anymore
(Bruce and Waldman (1990)).
Problems related to this dilemma are not limited to intertemporal
décisions. It also applies to models with uncertainty in which the beneficiary
has to make risky décisions, or in models with labor supply in which he has
to décide on the level of effort to be devoted to a given activity. In thèse
cases, distorsions of the Samaritan's dilemma type induce respectively more
risky choices and a lower level of effort, compared to the prevailing choices
and effort when benefactor's precommitment is assumed.
The model of this paper is based on the interaction between a selfish
son and an altruistic father and it assumes that the father has the last word,
like in Hirshieifer (1977). But it also contains savings décisions like in Bruce
and Waldman's (1990) contribution. The transfer frora the father to the
son is a bequest. But unlike in most bequest models, bequest is invested
and transferred only after the father's death (a quite natural feature for
bequests). Importantly, we assume that bequest is not a valid collatéral
for bank loans. As a conséquence, there is a crédit constraint bearing onStéphane Lambrecht 351
the son's consumption possibilities : savings can be positive or zéro but not
négative.
Laitner (1988) considered the social security System as a means to
force savings, thereby limiting the récipient's strategy space. Inefficiencies
would then be attenuated. The non-negativity restriction on savings in this
model is likely to produce the same outcome.
Nevertheless, as we shall see. the crédit constraint impinges on the
son's choice of the optimal level of action through the truncation of his
budget set. Indeed some levels of action, which we interpret in monetary
terms, become undesirable when crédit constraints are at work, while they
would not be so if savings were free to positive or négative. This leads to
a re-examination of the Rotten Kid Theorem under the hypothesis of non-
negative savings.
The results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, when the altruistic
benefactor's last word produces the offsprings' virtuous behavior, the crédit
constraint limits the extent of their stratégie behavior of the Samaritan's
dilemma type; this is an illustration that Rotten Kids, when behaving opti-
mally from the family point of view, are not necessarily able to draw large
transfers from their parents. Secondly, the non-negativity constraint on sa
vings can be, in some cases, responsible for the collapse of Rotten Kids'
virtuous behavior. This is a contradiction to Becker's (1974) happy resuit
and Hirshleifer's (1977) point. The analysis studies in détail thèse cases of
failure in the son's behavior. They appear when sons and parents hâve very
unequal resources.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. We
start looking at equilibria in section 3. Then, respectively in sections 4 and
5, we examine two polar cases and characterize conditions under which the
R.otten Kid Theorem is invalidated because of the crédit constraint. Section
6 comments the two results. Finally, the last section concludes.
2 The model
Since we want to demonstrate the possibility of a contradiction to the Rotten
Kid Theorem and the Samaritan's dilemma when crédit constraints are at
work, we set up a simple partial equilibrium model serving this purpose.
Bequest is the only transfer and is carried out after the parent's death.
Therefore parents hâve the last word. Children make intertemporal choices.
A more realistic model would of course be needed if we were interested in
the responses of aggregate consumption and capital accumulation to the
bearing of crédit constraints on agents' decision-making. But this is not our
purpose.
Time is discrète. We consider the interaction between an altruistic
benefactor and a selfish récipient in an economy which just lasts two periods.352 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(4), 2003
This economy is populated with altruistic parents, whom we name the P's
and who live only in the first period and selfish grown children, the C's,
who live two periods. The basic structure is simple : P shares his wealth
between consumption and bequest and, simultaneously, C smoothes his two
per-period consumptions through savings1.
At the very beginning of the first period, each C and each P in each
family Une is endowed, respectively, with w > 02 and W > 0 and with a joint
home production technology. The game between P and C has two steps :
production choices, followed by consumption choices. Thèse two stages of
the game between P and C ail take place at the beginning of the first period.
Indeed, no décisions are made in the second period since P is dead and C
only consumes the proceeds of his savings.
Once P and C hâve learned their endowments and technology, the
timing of their moves is as follows. In the first stage, production choices
are made by C. At the beginning of period 1, he picks up a point on the
joint home production frontier. This is what the literature refers to as the
choice of action. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that C chooses h, the
monetary value of the support he is willing to provide to P, whatever the
nature of this support (it can be a transfer in time or in commodities...).
Thus, in this first stage, C's choice object is h € [0, w) and the output which
instantaneously accrues to P (or, to be more précise, the monetary value of
the benefit for P of C's choice) is /(/i), with f'[h) > 0 and /(0) = 03.
In the second stage, the game proceeds with C endowed with w — h
and P with W+f(h). Both P and C simultaneously make their consumption
and bequest plans.
We assume that bequest is invested and transferred to C after P's
death, principal and interest. In the meanwhile, C can only consume up to
his first-period income, w — h. This is équivalent to assuming that future
bequests are not valid collaterals for bank loans. This assumption is crucial.
1 In this bare-bones model, the two periods we consider can be thought of as eut out from an overlapping
générations model. Alternative cut-outs hâve been used in the literature according to the scope of the
authors. The simplest way to think about our structure is the following. The first period is the initial period of
an OLG model, period t = 0. The first old only live during this period and their income is given; the young
agents live during period t = 0 and period i = 1, which implies savings.
2 We do not model labor participation. Nonetheless one can see this assumption as the child supplying
inelastically one unit of time on the labor market.
3 This may seem restrictive only at first sight. Suppose that support is measured in time, say t, spent on
old-caring. This kind of support, home support, is a substitute for the same kind of services from the market,
market support. Since we do not model labor participation, in the same course of idea, we do not want
to model the choice between leisure and home support. Thus t is not a décision variable in our model.
Nevertheless we shall implicitly handle variables like the monetary values of home support and market
support. The former is the income which C gives up by spending time on caring for P, i.e. w for each unit
of time. The latter is the price P would hâve had to pay if he had not been supported by C, say z for each
unit of time. C. by choosing h, can be seen as giving up wt units of income, even if the utility-maximizing
choice of t is not modelted as such. Similariy, what P freely gets, f{h), can be valued by what he would pay
for similar services on the market, i.e. zt. Then we hâve h = wt and /(/i) = zl, which can be rewritten in
terms of h as f(h) = (z/w)h. The average productivity ratio f(h)/h = z/w is therefore an indicator of
how home support services compare to market support services in terms of implicit prices.Stéphane Lambrecht 353
If the C's could back on future bequests to consume when young, savings
would freely be positive or négative and the timing of bequests would be
irrelevant. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that there is no alterna
tive collatéral so that savings are constrained to be non-negative. This is
not restrictive. Allowing for some other collatéral asset would only shift the
lower bound downwards but would not cancel it.
No transfers between P and C are made during the flrst period. In
their contribution, Bruce and Waldman (1990) argued that parents may
hâve an incentive to make no transfer during the fîrst period when crédit
constraints are at work. Indeed such transfers would feed the Samaritan's
dilemma problem because children hâve then an incentive to overconsume
any first-period transfer. We shall follow this Une of argument. However,
Bruce and Waldman (1990) do not model capital market imperfection ex-
plicitly. We argue that the non-negativity constraint, bearing on savings, in
turn, modifies the domain of validity of the Rotten Kid Theorem.
C's utility and budget constraints are respectively
w — h = c + s
R(s + X) = d
s^O
where c is his current consumption, R the interest factor and d is C's second-
period consumption, after P's death. Taking bequest as given, C maximizes
his utility Uc with respect to savings under the above three constraints.
This yields the first-order conditions : (1 - (3) (w — h — s)"1 ^ fi{s + X)-1,
with equality if s > 04. C's behavior is characterized by his saving décision
s = max {0,a(X, h)} where
a{X, h) = 0{w-h)-{l-P)X (1)
P's utility and budget constraint are
Up = (l-a)\ogD + aUc
W + f{h) = D + X
X SïO
where D is P's consumption and X the bequest to be passed to C after P's
death. Taking savings as given, P maximizes his utility Up under the above
two constraints. This yields the first-order conditions (1 - a){W 4- f(h) —
4 Given priées and incomes, if the non-negativity constraint is not binding, the optimal consumptions are
identical to the ones of the free-saving problem, (cF, dF\ If, on the contrary, the non-negativity constraint
on savings binds, optimal consumptions verify : c = w — h ^ cF and d = RX ^ dF.354 Recherches Économiques de Louvain- Louvain Economie Review 69(4), 2003
X)~l ^ a0(X + s)"1, with equality if X > 0. P's behavior is described by
his bequest décision X = max{0,£(s,/i)} where
3 Equilibria
As is usual in a two-stage game, we solve it backward. Given /i, we are
looking for the stage 2 Nash equilibrium (s*, X*), i.e. the one which, among
ail (s,XV is a best response for both C and P. A unique Nash equilibrium
exists. There are non-negativity constraints on both savings and bequest.
Therefore the Nash equilibrium can be one of three alternative disetinct
types : either only bequest is positive, either both bequest and saving are
positive, or only saving is positive1.
Let u(h) = (w- h)/ [W + f(h)] be the relative endowments after the
production décision (choice of h). This variable decreases as h increases.
Let u(0) = w/W be the initial relative endowments. It reflects how C's and
P's incomes compare before the choice of support h by C. The wealthier C
(respectively, poorer) with respect to P at the beginning of the game, the
higher (resp., lower) w(0).
The zero-saving and positive-bequest subgame equilibrium is obtained
by taking s = 0 in (2), which yields
This happens when u(h) < wa, with us = a (1 - 0) / [1 - a (1 - /?)]. The
positive-saving and positive-bequest subgame equilibrium is obtained by
solving a (x, h\ and £ (s, h) for s and X, which yields
s* (h) = (1 - <*(1 - 0)) (w-h)-a(l-0)\W + f(h)] (4)
X*(h) = a [W + f{h)} - (1 - a)(w - h) (5)
This happens when ujs < u{h) < ux, with ljx = a/(l - a). Finally, positive-
saving and zero-bequest subgame equilibrium is obtained by taking X = 0
in (1), which yields
s*{h)=P{w-h) (6)
This happens when oj{h) ^ cux. The second-stage unique equilibrium can be
any of the thèse three ones, depending on the value of the relative endow
ments o?(/i).
5 The case of both zero-saving and zero-bequest cannot be an equilibrium of the second stage game since
one of them has to be positive to insure positive consumption d after P's death.Stéphane Lambrecht 355
Intuitively. given h, P will leave a bequest only if he is sufficiently
wealthy with respect to C. This happens when u>(h) = (w - h)/ [W + f(h)]
is low enough, i.e. v(h) < cjx. He will leave no bequest if C is so wealthy that
only a négative bequest would be optimal for him. He is then constrained
on his bequest décision. The same kind of reasoning applies for C's saving
décision. He would like to dissave (s < 0) in the case he is so poor with
respect to his parent that uj(h) ^ u>s. This means that he would be willing
to consume in period 1 a share of next-period bequest. But since bequest
is not a valid collatéral, this is not feasible. Thus C only consumes his first-
period income, with savings being zéro.
We now go one step backward in the game. C then chooses the optimal
level of support to his P, h* ^ 0. He will départ from the initial relative
endowments lj(0) by choosing a positive h only if this is optimal for him.
Let us first think on what it means, for C, to choose the level of
support to be provided to P. The choice of h détermines the position of C's
intertemporal budget constraint. As a référence, suppose that savings are
free to be positive or négative. Then C's only problem would be to choose
the level of h ^ 0 which places his budget constraint at the highest position
in order to widen his consumption possibilities. This is équivalent to saying
that he would choose
h* = arg raax w — h + X(h)
he[o,w)
where w — h + X(h) is C's présent value lifetime income. Thus, in a free-
saving problem, the first stage of the game would consist in choosing the
value of h ^ 0 maximizing the lifetime-income, with X(h) = a [W + f{h)} —
(l — a)(w — h) or zéro. If an optimal positive level of support exists, it means
that increasing h away from zéro shifts the intertemporal budget constraint
upward.
When savings are constrained to be non-négative, instead, there is an
additional effect to this upward move of the budget line. To illustrate it, let
us set h = 0 and assume X(0) > 0 and s(0) > 0. Any consumptions (c, d)
verifying c > w and d < RX(0) is not feasible given the non-negativity con
straint on savings. Graphically (figure 1), in the (c, d) diagram, ail the pairs
of consumptions which are located in the "south-east" area with respect to
the "max-c min-d point", (^^^(O)), point B, are not feasible since they
would imply négative savings. Let us name this area the "south-east sha
re", BCD. Consumption possibilities are defined by the budget constraint :
w + X(0) = c + d/R and by the condition c ^ w.
Now, suppose the budget constraint moves upward as h increases (ar-
row heading north-east), i.e. there is room for a positive support from C to
P (X'(0) > 1). What happens to the south-east share ? It gets larger (from
BCD to B'C'D'). Indeed, the upper bound on first-period consumption de-
creases (c < w — h) (from D to D') and C has to give up some consumption
possibilities which were opened to him when h = 0. He simultaneously gains
ABB'A' and looses BDD'E.356 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(4), 2003
Therefore, when crédit constraints are at work, the choice of the op
timal value of support is not merely one of choosing the highest position
for the budget Une Uke in the free-saving problem. Indeed, the higher the
budget Une position, the larger the south-east share is and, thus, the shorter
the budget Une (from AB to A'B').
If any positive support is to be optimal for C, then not only, the budget
Une must lie above its initial position Uke in the free problem but also it
should not shrink away too much to the "north-west". Therefore a trade-off
should arise between consumption possibilities gained in the north-west side
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Figure 1
We shall assume a linear home production funtion for simplicity:
/() = Oh. Purthermore, we assume that 9 > 1. Given our interprétation
of h and f(h) in monetary terms, the assumption 9 > 1 is équivalent to
assuming that home support is less costly than similar market support6.
Since u)(h) = (w - h)/ [W + f(h)] is a decreasing function of h, we
necessarily hâve oj(h) < o>(0),V7i e [0,w). By choosing h*, C détermines
6 When 9 < 1, it is easy to prove that the gains (rom providing a positive level of support are always smaller
than the losses. No support to P is then ever provided by C, an outeome in accordance with the fact that
market support services are, in that case, relatively less costly than home support services. When 0 = 1,
the indirect utility function does not dépend on h in the région with positive savings and bequest and the
analysis gets poorer. We leave aside thèse two uninteresting cases.Stéphane Lambrecht 357
the relative endowments u{h*) for the second stage game and, thus, the
associated equilibrium (5* (h") ,X* {h*)). Three cases are conceivable.
Firstly, C's initial income w might be so low with respect to P's initial
income W that the relative initial endowments w/W lies in the zero-saving
région :w(0) G (0,ws]. In this case, whether optimal support h* is strictly
positive or zéro, the ensuing second stage equilibrium is always one with
zéro savings and positive bequests as given by (3). In that case, note that C
worsens the constraint bearing on his first-period consumption if he chooses
to provide a positive level of support. Indeed maximum constrained con
sumption goes from c = w to c = w — h.
In the zero-saving région, X*(h) = a(3 [W + 9h] / [1 - a(l - /?)]. It is
an increasing linear function of h. There can be no gains from positive sup
port if the following condition is not met7 : X*' (0) > 1. Given the expression
of bequests in the saving-constrained région, this condition is équivalent to
the following condition on 6 :
This condition is necessary because otherwise the budget line always go
down as h increases. This can only lead to lower utility. We shall refer to
this condition as the high productivity condition for support (alternatively,
home support much less costly than market support).
The second case is when the initial relative endowments verify : w(0) €
(ùjs,ljx). Depending on the optimal value of h, the selected second stage
equilibrium is either one with both positive savings and bequests ((4) and
(5)), or one with zéro savings and positive bequests. Let us dénote by hs >
0 the threshold value of h such that u(hs) = ujs. Thus if h* < hs, the
equilibrium is with positive savings and bequests. If hs ^ h*, equilibrium
bequests are positive while savings are zéro, i.e. C is constrained on savings.
In this second case, bequests are given by X*(h) = a[W + 0h] — (1 — a)(w —
h). It is easy to check that X*'(0) > 1 is always satisfied V0 > 1. Thus,
increasing h on (0, ha) will always resuit in a higher position of the budget
line. Beyond hs, the budget line goes on upward if condition (7) is satisfied.
The last case obtains when C is relatively wealthy with respect to P :
w(0) G [ux, +00). Define hx > 0 as the value of support verifying :u/ (hx) =
ux. Suppose h* < hx. Then bequests are constrained in equilibrium and
savings unconstrained : C finds it optimal to give up the possibility of a
future bequest from P. If hx < h* < hs, bequests are then positive as
well as savings. Finally, for hs ^ ti*, savings are constrained and bequests
unconstrained. In this last case, the budget line goes down as h increases
from 0 to hx. Indeed, for thèse values of support, C would lower his first-
period income but would get nothing anyway in the second period since
bequests are constrained. On (hXihs), the budget line always shifts upwards
7 This condition is obtained by requiring the derivative of w — h + X(h) to be strictly positive at h = 0.358 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(4), 2003
V0 > 1 (see second case). Finally, beyond hs, the same holds as in the first
case.
It is easy to prove that optimal support is always positive when the
initial relative endowments, u;(0) = w/W, lie in the intermediate région with
positive savings and bequests (the second case in the discussion above). We
want to investigate the effects of crédit constraints on the two polar cases.
Can poor C's (u>(0) ^ ujs) optimal support be positive in equilibrium or is
it always equal to zéro because of the crédit constraint ? On the opposite, is
it always the case that wealthy C's (u>x ^ u>(0)) behave optimally frora the
family point of view, i.e. provide positive support to their P or can they fail
in doing so ?
Using c = w — h — s and d = R(s + X) and plugging s* (h) and X*(h)
into C's utility function, we obtain C's objective function in stage 1, namely
his indirect utility function, stemming from stage 2
Ue(h) = (1-0)log[w-h- s*(h)} + /?log{R[s*(h) + X*{h)]} (8)
Let us examine successively the case of poor C's, i.e. saving-contrained C's
(o;(0) ^ ljs) and then the case of wealthy C's, i.e. C's who are initially
bequest-constrained (u)x ^ )
4 Saving-constrained C's
If C is characterized by cj(0) ^ u;6, he will always reach a saving-constrained
equilibrium in stage 2 : s* (h) = 0. His indirect utility thus writes : Uc(h) =
(1-0) \og{w-h) + p\og [RX*(h)}, with X*(h) given by (3), with f(h) = $h
and 9 > 1. At first sight, it seems that poor C's should never be willing to
provide support to their P because of the bearing of the crédit constraint. We
dérive conditions under which they nevertheless provide positive support,
thereby worsening the constraint on their first-period consumption.
Proposition 1 Suppose that (i) C is constrained on savings (o>(0) ^ cjs)
and that (ii) productivity of support is high (9 > 1 + (1 — a)faj3). Then C's
optimal support to P is given by h = max {Q,0u> - (1 - (3) Wfj3). It is posi
tive when the initial relative endowments w(0) = w/W lies in the following
interval:
1-0 w a(l-fl)
09 W ** l-a(l-0)
If w/W ^ (1-0)/09 ^ a(l -0) [1 - a(l - 0)]~l, he chooses to provide no
support to P. (Proof in appendix)
Therefore, being saving-constrained at the beginning of the game
(io(Q) ^ u)s) does not mean that optimal support is zéro. When productivity
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low, it might actually be optimal for the selfish récipient C to strengthen
even more the crédit constraint to reach a higher utility. Let us illustrate
this graphically.
C uses h to shift his budget constraint upward (see the upward arrow
in figure 2). He can do so because condition
(1 - 0)/0O ^ a (1 - 0) [1 - a(l - 0)\
-î
is équivalent to condition 9 > 1 + (1 - a)/a/3 which guarantees that the
budget Une can go upward as h increases in the zero-saving région. An opti
mum with positive support is like point B' with coordinates : c* ( h ) = w—h,
d* (h) = RX* (h). It is the max-c min-d point with positive support h. It is
located to the north-west with respect to B, the max-c min-d point with zéro
support (e*(0) = w,d*(0) = RX'(O)) because of the growing truncation of
the budget set as h increases (the arrow heading to the left). Importantly,
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On the contrary, if any positive support shifts point B onto a lower
utility contour, like in figure 3. no support is provided. Indeed, even for
high 9, there exists a threshold, û>, of the relative initial endowments cj(0) =
w/W below which the optimal level of support to P is zéro : w/W ^ (1 —360 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(4), 2003
j3)/00 ^ a(l — /3)[1— a(l — (3)] l. What this case of very low-wage earners
(oj(0) < û) tells us is that, when C is sufficiently poor with respect to P, any
positive level of support brings more losses than gains. When this happens,
the desired level of support is actually négative, i.e. C wants support from P.










Since C is saving-constrained. as figure 3 shows, the indifférence curve
associated with zéro support passes through the max-c min-d point B. As
h increases, bequest rises and the budget constraint goes upward but the
upper bound on first-period consumption, w — h, simultaneously goes down
(shift from D to D'). If, for any positive level of support, this cost of giving up
consumption possibilities in the south-east area (from BCD to B'C'D') is so
important and/or indifférence contours are so steepy that the new truncated
budget constraint lies completely on the left side of the indifférence curve
passing through B, then C will abstain from supporting P.
When C is free to dissave (his budget constraint then includes the
south-east share B'C'D'), he does not incur such a cost so that the upward
move of the budget constraint (from ABC to A'B'C) is enough to convince
him to support P. This means that, in this case, C would be better off if,
in some way, bequest could be a valid collatéral for bank loans : from his
welfare point of view, it would thus be désirable to relax the non-negativity
constraint on savings.Stéphane Lambrecht 361
The fact that the non-negativity constraint can be responsible for the
failure of C to support P illustrâtes that the simple existence of a P with
strongly altruistic préférences (Becker (1974)) and his having the last word
(Hirshleifer (1977)) in an intertemporal framework do not necessarily pro
vide C with the automatic incentive to behave optimally from the household
point of view. This is true if intertemporal choices are free. The first teaching
of the introduction of crédit constraints is thus that poor C's may fail to be
have optimally from the family point of view because of the non-negativity
constraint on savings.
Of course, this does not guarantee that P, if given the opportunity,
would be willing to provide support to C or, to be more précise, that he
would be willing to make both an inter-vivos gift and a bequest in the sensé
that we assumed. Hère we might find again the trade-off between inefficient
action (support) and inefficient savings (Bruce and Waldman (1990)).
Let us summarize the saving-constrained case. If "having the last wor-
d" means leaving a bequest (and there is no reason for there to be a contra
diction) , then there is no more the guarantee that the Rotten Kid Theorem
holds for the same range of relative endowments u>(0) as when no constraint
bears on savings : the reason is that, when savings are constrained to be
non-negative, the exercise of choosing the highest position for the budget
constraint is no more a costless exercise. It is not worth the trouble if the
price to pay is too high.
Bequest-constrained C's
To the opposite, very rich C's (i.e. those with u;(0) G [wx,oo]) will hâve the
opportunity to sélect a value for uj(h) in any of the three régions : the zero-
bequest région [a;x,oo], the positive-saving positive-bequest région (uis,u>x)
or the zero-saving région [0,a;s). Given this, the maximum of the objective
function : Uc{h) = (1 - /?) log [w-h- s* (h)] + /?log {R [s* (h) + X*(h)]} is
more difficult to find. Indeed, the derivative of X*(h) in h = hx and the one
of s*{h) in h = hs are not uniquely defined. Remind that thèse values of h
verify u) (hx) = u>x and u> (hs) = w.s.
Thus we proceed in two steps in order to find h* — arg max|n,,o) Uc(h).
The first one consists in calculating
h = arg max Uc(h)
he[o.hr]
h = arg max Uc(h)
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and the second step is to sélect among h, h and h, the one which maximizes
Uc(h), i.e. h* = argmaxr^- ^i Uc(h). We show in appendix that h = 0,
h = hs and that h = hs when productivity of support is low.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (i) C is bequest-constrained (u>x < u>(0)) and
that (ii) productivity of support is low (1 < 0 < 1 + (1 — a)/a0). Then C's
optimal support is positive and is given by h* = hs when the initial relative




If, instead, a/(l - a) < a/ [1 - a (1 + 0(0 - 1))] < w/W, C's optimal sup
port is zéro. (Proof in appendix)
The second teaching of this paper is therefore the following. When C is
relatively rich with respect to P (u)x < o'(O)), there exists a threshold value,
a/ [1 — a (1 + 0(0 — 1))], for the initial relative endowments w(0), beyond
which optimal support is zéro whereas, below it, a positive level of support
would be provided by C.
This is not spécifie to the model with non-negative savings. Indeed,
if savings were free to be positive or négative, there would also be such a
threshold. Indeed, when savings are free, the différence £/c(0) - Uc(w) is
positive, zéro or négative according to
"M I db (9)
It is easy to check that the free-problem threshold a/(l — aô) is lower
than the constrained-problem threshold a/ [1 — a (1 + 0(0 — l))]8. Why is
it so? The explanation is again to be found in the particular changes in
consumption possibilities arousing when saving must be non-negative.
Indeed, for a given low productivity 0 (i.e. for 0 € (1,1 + (1 - a)/a/3)),
when C is that rich with respect to P, the ratio oj(0) = w/W is so far above
u)(hx) = u)x that it takes a high level of support hx for u)(h) to reach the
critical value iox. Only after hx has been spent, there starts to be some
8 Note that the same alternative threshold would obtain if, instead of bequest and free savings, a simple
inter-vivos gift is assumed. Of course savings would be différent and always positive
s(h) = a.5 (w - h + W + 0h) > 0
But the critical value separating positive support from zéro support under the case u>(0) > ux would also
be a/(1 — aO). It is easy to check that we hâve the following ordering
a cv a
UJx ~ 1 -a < 1 -a(1 +(3{0 - 1)) < 1 -a0Stéphane Lambrecht 363
gains to provide support, thèse gains being an increasing positive bequest.
Indeed, as figures 4 and 5 show, in the range [0, hx], C's intertemporal budget
constraint moves downward a great deal (arrow heading south-west) since
bequest remains zéro on the whole way. The further u>(0) from u>.r, the larger
the downward move of the budget constraint (from ABC to A'C). Note that
as long as h < hx consumption possibilities are not truncated. They are ail
associated with positive savings since there is no second period income when
bequest is zéro. Beyond hx, as h goes on increasing, the budget constraint
starts to move upward (arrow heading north-east on figures 4 and 5) and
truncation appears. But it is not sure that it can go back and over its initial
zéro-support position ABC, i.e. it is not sure that X (hs) > hx. If it cannot,
then optimal support is zéro. Tins outcome is common to the constrained
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If, instead, the budget Une can go back and over its position ABC,
then the free problem will always yield a positive support, because the
budget line includes the dotted Une B"C". but the constrained problem
might not yield a positive optimal support, due to the cost in terms of
consumption possibilities (the share B"C"D"). Indeed it is not sure that
the budget constraint of the constrained problem, once above its initial
position ABC, will not be so truncated that it stands ail on the left side of
the indifférence curve passing through B, i.e. in a lower utility région. An
example of this subcase is given in figure 4 (the shift from B to B" with364 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Lointain Economie Review 69(4), 2003
h = hs). Only if the max-c min-rf point B" is on the good side (right side) of












It is easy to illustrate with an example that the validity domain of
Becker's (1974) happy resuit is not as large as it is when savings are free. Let
us dénote by h* and h}, respectively, the optimal support of the constrai-
ned and the free problem. For relative initial endowments u>(0) in between
the above two threshold values : a/ [1 - a (1 + p{6 - 1))] < a/ (1 - a9), the
free-problem optimal support is positive while the constrained-problem op
timal support is zéro. This is precisely the case in which the intertemporal
budget constraint reaches a higher gênerai position (hj > Oj but the set
of points situated north-west of w — h hâve got the meanest share and
constrained C's choose not to support their P's (h* = 0).
Thus, for the same productivity 0, when C can borrow against his
future bequest, he provides a positive level of support to P whereas, when
he cannot, the optimal support is zéro. The non-negativity constraint on
saving widens the upper range over which C is too rich to be willing to
help P. This is so because it lias been so costly, in terms of consumption
opportunities, to bring bequest and resources that high, that only lower-
utility points are reachable with respect to the zéro-support option.Stéphane Lambrecht 365
6 Non-negative savings, the Samaritan
and the Rotten Kid
Let us summarize the underlying hypothèses of this analysis. In this model,
the benefactor P has the last word because he leaves a bequest after the
récipient's choice of the level of support. But there is more at work hère :
bequest is carried out after the récipient's saving décision (bequest as a
post-mortem transfer). In a sensé, it cornes out late. So let us refer to the
exercise of that type of lastword by the expression "benefactor's last word
with lateness". Given crédit constraints, future bequest cannot be used to
finance current consumption.
In that context, inter-vivos gifts, unmodelled hère, hâve a tendency
to be overconsumed by récipients, as Bruce and Waldman (1990) explained.
We derived conditions under which this exercise of the lastword with late
ness associated with crédit constraints could, on the one hand, limits the
space over which the selfish récipient can behave strategically but. on the
other hand, still guarantees the happy resuit of the Rotten Kid Theorem.
Under the free-saving hypothesis, when the benefactor has the lastword, the
récipient under-saves with respect to the level he would save if the benefac
tor could commit on bequest, and he does so to présent himself destitute
in the second period and draw a large bequest from his benefactor. In our
model. when optimal support is positive, i.e. when the Rotten Kid Theorem
holds, C cannot consume more than w — h in his first period of life. The
non-negativity constraint on savings therefore places an upper bound on
the extent to which C can "free-ride" on P's benevolence. We found that C
can sometimes consider optimal to worsen the constraint bearing on him by
providing a positive level of support. This is the good side of the problem.
But we also showed the other one, namely that the benefactor's "lateness"
can undo the benefactor's "last word".
This happens when the récipient fails to support the benefactor while
he would choose a positive support in the absence of crédit constraints.
Indeed, in both cases of poor and rich C's, what is responsible for the failure
of C to support P is that growing parts of the the récipient's south-east
consumption possibilities are destroyed by support. Those losses might be so
important that only lower utility levels can be reached by providing positive
support. As a conséquence, the range of initial relative endowments a>(0),
over which the Rotten Kid Theorem holds, shrinks when there are crédit
constraints and when the parent's last word is exercised with "lateness". As
a conséquence, in those cases, P is also worse off.366 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(4), 2003
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we just slightly amended the altruistic bequest model : our
point was that, bequest being what it is, namely a post-mortem transfer, it
was ail but far-fetched to assume that heirs cannot back on a future bequest
to finance their current consumption by bank loans. Surprisingly enough,
this assumption has received scarce attention in the literature on altruism.
We showed how the induced non-negativity constrained on savings générâtes
a twofold resuit.
On the one hand, crédit constraints and the exercise of the last word
through bequest resuit in standing on the selfish beneficiary's way and stop-
ping him drawing large amount of resources out of the benefactor's genero-
sity. On the other hand, under conditions which we derived, a selfish réci
pient may fail to provide support to his altruistic benefactor due to costs
in terms of consumption possibilities. The benefactor himself is harmed by
thèse costs he inflicts on C. This happens in the case of dissimilar parents
and children, but, curiously enough, both rich and poor parents and/or chil-
dren are concerned. It is what we called their lateness associated with crédit
constraints which causes the failure of récipients to behave optimally.
One question which could be next on the research agenda is : instead
of treating altruistic bequest as an inter-vivos gift, i.e. instead of ruling
out crédit constraints, it should be worthwhile wondering how bequest with
"lateness" and inter-vivos gifts can be both accounted for by the altruistic
model when crédit constraints bear on intertemporal choices ?Stéphane Lambrecht 367
Appendix
A Optimal support from saving-constrained C's
Proof of proposition 1. In the zero-saving région, the utilitv function is
Uc{h) = (1 - 0) \og{w -h) + 0log [RX*{h)\, with
X*(h) = a/3 [W + 0h] / [1 - q(1 - 0)). Support h can take values between
0 and w. The fîrst term of Uc(h) decreases with h (derivative :
-(1-/3) /(w — h)) and the second one increases with h (derivative :
00/ [W + 0h]). We must pick up h* = argmax(0,u>) Uc{h).
The function Uc(h) is always decreasing on [0, w) if (1 — 0) /w ^ 06/W.
This condition is équivalent to
w W 1-0
In this case, the maximum is reached for h = 0. On the contrary, if
uj(0) > 00/(1 — 0), Uc(h) starts increasing, its slope Urc(h) is positive for
any h satisfying h < h = 0w - (1 - 0) W/0, beyond, Uc(h) decreases.
The first-order conditions are
w — h W + 6h
with equality if h > 0. The expression of optimal h on [0,w), if positive, is
given by :
h = 0w-(l-0) W/9
It is always inferior to w. The condition h > 0 is équivalent to
û=u)(h) <cj(0) (11)
with û = (1 - 0) /06. Condition û <us has to be verified for (11) to hold for
a saving-constrained C. When productivity of support is high this is always
true because û < u?s is équivalent to condition (7) on 0:0 > 1 + (1 - a)/a0,
i.e. the necessary condition we identified earlier on to insure that the budget
Une goes upward as h increases when w/W is in the zero-saving région..
Thus, conditions û < cj(0) ^ u>s yield a positive optimal support h of a
saving-constrained C.
B Optimal support from bequest-constrained C
Proof of proposition 2. Taking, in (8), s* (h) or X*(h) equal to zéro when
needed, the indirect utility function reveals its local maxima on the three368 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 69(4), 2003
intervais. A quick inspection of Uc{h) shows that the function is always de-
creasing in h in the zero-bequest région, reaching a maximum at zéro : h = 0.
On [hx,hs], the function is strictly increasing : h = hs. On [hs.w), things
are similar to the case of saving-constrained C's. We know by the analysis
of the previous case (o>(0) < u;s), that, solved over the whole interval [0, u>),
the zero-saving problem has first-order conditions as in (10). Condition
û = u>(h) = (1 — 0)/00 < u(Q) guarantees that Uc{h) is not always de-
creasing so that the solution is interior to the interval [0,w). This interior
maximum is actually reached in the interval [hs,w), and not for values such
that h < hs9, when h also satisfies u>(h) = (1-/3) J00 < us = ai (hs), i.e.
when productivity of support is high in the sensé we defined. If we hâve
either w(0) < ù or (1 — 0) //39 ^ u;s (the last condition being "low produc
tivity of support"), optimal support on [hs,w) is hs.
Let us now make the low productivity assumption ojs < û.
Thus h = h = hs and, because ujx < u;(0), the other candidate is
h = 0. We therefore want to compare Uc(0) and Uc(hs). Substituting for h
in (8) and taking s* (ha) = 0 and X*(0) = 0 when needed, we get :






One easily checks that 1 - a (1 + 0{0 - 1)) ^ 0 iff
which is exactly the condition defining the low productivity région. There-
fore:
1 Tf ^ <-
1-a (1 + 0(0-1)) W
Uc(0)-Uc(hs)>0
and optimal support is zéro.
a w a
2-If 1 < ^F ^ 1 n 1 — a W 1 — ail
and optimal support is hs.
9 Otherwise the function is concave but decreasing on [hs, w).Stéphane Lambrecht 369
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